We use the Immigrants Admitted to the United States (micro-data) supplemented with special tabulations from the Department of Homeland Security to examine how family reunification impacts the age composition of new immigrant cohorts since 1980. We develop a family migration multiplier measure for the period 1981 to 2009 that improves on prior studies by including IRCA immigrants and relaxing unrealistic assumptions required by synthetic cohort measures. Results show that every 100 initiating immigrants admitted between 1981-85 sponsored an average of 260 family members; the comparable figure for initiating immigrants for the 1996-2000 cohort is 345 family members. Furthermore, the number of family migrants ages 50 and over rose from 44 to 74 per 100 initiating migrants. The discussion considers the health and welfare implications of late-age migration in a climate of growing fiscal restraint and an aging native population.
Introduction
Notwithstanding promises by the current and previous administration to overhaul the immigration system, regional and ideological divisions within and between political parties have prevented reforms except for those tied to security, border control and interior enforcement. The consequences of inaction are formidable because the United States has witnessed major social, economic and demographic changes since the last major overhaul in immigration legislation and because the current admission criteria, which give preference to family reunification relative to labor market needs, have produced a host of unintended consequences, most notably chain migration (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1986; Yu 2008 ) and formidable visa backlogs for countries that send large numbers of migrants to the United States .
Immigration is often described as a mechanism to forestall population aging in industrial societies because most international migrants are in their prime working ages or younger; however, the rejuvenating effects of migration on the age structure of industrial societies are modest, even in countries with long immigration histories (UN 2001) . Furthermore, rejuvenating effects also depend on age at arrival, which many countries ignore for family unification migrants. Simply put, as the age at entry of international migrants rises, not only does their reproductive impact via future fertility fall, but so also does their potential economic benefit via years of potential work experience.
Although the United States has not witnessed below replacement fertility, such as many OECD countries, the swelling visa backlogs coupled with growing concerns about population aging raise questions about the wisdom of unrestricted late-age migration. Except for a spate of studies following the 1996 welfare that restricted immigrants' access to means-tested social benefits (e.g., Friedland and Pankaj, 1997; Fix and Passel, 1999; Treas, 1997) , there has been limited attention to changes in late-age migration as distinct from aging of the foreign-born population (but see Terrazas, 2009) . With the exception of Terrazas (2009) and Treas (1997) , there has been limited interest in the phenomenon of late-age migration.
Surprisingly, the Congressional Research Service and the DHS Office of Immigration
Statistics provide limited or no age composition breakdowns for new legal residents in their published reports. 1 As an initial foray to the phenomenon of late-age migration, we use age 50 as a lower threshold for several reasons. Age 50 represents approximately two-thirds of average life expectancy, and for most workers, an age when earnings growth slows. Moreover, people who migrate at that age or older are likely to experience work history disruption that may adversely affect their prospects for retirement income or other benefits (Treas, 1997; Angel, 2003; Binstock and Jean-Baptiste, 1999) . Specifically, eligibility for Social Security and full Medicare benefits are linked to 40 full quarters of employment; individuals who migrate after age 50 may be hard pressed to accrue the requisite ten years of qualifying employment, particularly if English language proficiency is limited. 2009. 3 We argue that family-sponsored migration is largely responsible for this trend, which appears to be an unintended by-product of the family reunification priorities that exclude parents from worldwide and country numerical limits and the preference categories that permit citizens to sponsor adult siblings. To make our case, we derive estimates for a family migration multiplier, which is a measure of chain migration that reflects the number of additional immigrants that are associated with initiating non-family immigrants. Unlike prior studies of chain migration, our approach is designed to portray cohort variation in family sponsored migration by region of origin and age at admission. In this analysis, we focus on the age composition of family sponsored legal permanent residents (LPRs). 4
Figure 1 About Here
In what follows, we first review studies about chain migration and the social significance of late-age immigration. Subsequently we discuss the measure of chain migration developed by Bin Yu (2005 Yu ( , 2008 , identifying its strengths and opportunities for refinement. After elaborating our approach to refine Yu's measure benefits. The Affidavits of Support are enforceable until the sponsored immigrant works 10 years or becomes a citizen. In practice no action has been taken against citizens who sponsor family members and do not provide full support. Personal communication from Ruth E. Wasem, January, 2011. 3 Admission into LPR status includes both status adjusters, who comprise over half of each cohort, and new arrivals. 4 Legal permanent residents, as they are recognized by USDHS, are referred to as immigrants, LPRs, lawful permanent residents, permanent resident aliens, and green-card holders. They are distinct from nonimmigrants, which are persons temporarily granted entry into the United States for a specific purpose such as tourism (USDHS, 2009, September 10 Jasso and Rosenzweig (1986; considered IRCA status adjusters in their analyses of chain migration. The final section discusses the social welfare and policy implications of our findings.
Background
The family unification provisions of the 1965 Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) enabled family chain migration by giving priority to family reunification in allocating visas. Currently about two-thirds of all new admissions enter under the family reunification provisions, which exempt immediate family members of U.S. citizens from numerical limitation and allow additional family sponsorship under numerically capped family preference categories. Of the 1.1 million legal permanent residents admitted in 2009, for example, 66 percent (approximately 750 thousand) were family-based; of these, 76 percent were immediate relatives of U.S. citizens, and therefore not subject to the country or family preference category caps (USDHS, 2010) . 5 Partly because they are not subject to annual caps, immediate relatives, including spouses, unmarried dependent children and parents of U.S. citizens constitute the lion's share of family-sponsored migrants, with the remainder allocated to family sponsored preferences that are subject to the annual worldwide 5 Only 13 percent of permanent resident visas issued in 2009 were for employment; 16 percent were for asylees and refugees; and the remainder-about 5 percent-were issued for diversity or other criteria (USDHS, 2009). and country ceilings. These family preference visas are subject to the 7 percent maximum of the worldwide level; this is not an entitlement or quota set aside, but rather a per-country maximum in any given year . That visas are issued according to date of filing and restricted by country ceilings has produced large backlogs for oversubscribed countries, such as Mexico and the Philippines, where wait times from petition to visa granting extend up to a decade or more (Wasem, 2010: 12) . The implication of these delays is that thousands of sponsored adult family members will age in situ from the date their application is approved until their priority date for receiving a visa.
Chain migration, the process by which migrants from a particular location join relatives in the same destination, is important consequence of family reunification entitlements because "each new immigrant becomes a potential immigrant sponsor" (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990: 213) . Especially noteworthy for understanding the potential multiplicative impact of the INA family sponsorship provisions is the exemption from annual caps of immediate family members (spouses, dependent children and parents) of U.S. citizens. Although legal permanent residents can only sponsor immediate family members (only spouses and dependent children and only under a numerically-limited preference category), after naturalization they can sponsor parents as well as adult offspring and siblings.
The 1965 Amendments to the INA substantially altered chain migration from Asia, which was severely restricted until that time; thereafter chain migration from Asia witnessed a large spike (Jasso & Rosenzweig 1986; Yu 2005; Heinberg et al. 1989) . During the 1970s and 1980s, Asian nations contributed the largest numbers of non-family immigrants, most of who entered either as skilled employees or government-sponsored refugees after the fall of U.S.-backed governments in Southeast Asia. Many activated family migration chains by sponsoring spouses and children as well as unmarried sons and daughters within the country-specific limits (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1989) .
If the growth of chain migration is widely acknowledged, its magnitude is the subject of some dispute (Arnold, Cariño, Fawcett, & Park 1989; Heinberg, Harris, & York 1989; Jasso & Rosenzweig 1989; 1986; Yu 2008) . Activist groups that oppose current immigration thresholds, such as NumbersUSA, characterize family preferences as "endless and often snow-balling chains of foreign nationals. With the notable exceptions of Yu (2005; 2008) and Jasso and Rosenzweig (1986; (Jasso & Rosenzweig 1986 , 1990 ; rely on stated preferences about planned sponsorship of family members rather than actual petitions (Arnold et al. 1989) ; or analyze sponsor characteristics retrospectively based on a crosssection of unification immigrants rather than the propensity for future family sponsorship (Heinberg, Harris & York 1989) . Finally, most of the existing studies focus on family sponsorship behavior up to 1980, thus excluding the period during which there were two major revisions to immigration laws that have direct implications for estimates of chain migration. These include the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, which legalized over 2.5 million undocumented migrants, and the 1990 Immigration Act, which raised the worldwide ceilings for capped legal immigrants, including family sponsorship categories subject to numerical limitation . None of the existing studies specifically address variation in age structure of family sponsored immigrants.
Only Jasso and Rosenzweig (1989) and Yu (2005) use demographic methods to derive estimates of family chain migration, but owing to differing assumptions and measures, their estimates differ. Jasso and Rosenzweig (1989) claim that an initiating nonfamily immigrant subsequently sponsors between 1.2 and 1.4 additional family members. Yu (2008) estimated that chain migration is as high as 4.2 additional persons per initiating immigrant, of which half (2.1) are associated with sponsorship of family members. Both studies considered regional origins variation in the impact of the family multiplier, but not the age composition of the sponsored migrants.
Using readily available microdata for legal immigrant admissions between 1972 , Yu (2008 developed an innovative unification multiplier that is grounded in LPR admissions (rather than both admissions and time to naturalization eligibility). His approach represents an improvement over previous methods because it incorporates all forms of family sponsorship and nearly all nonfamily immigrant pathways to family unification. On the downside, Yu's (2008) synthetic cohort methodology assumed no cohort or period variation in the processes that contribute to migration, despite known temporal and regional spikes Our analysis builds on the strengths of Yu's approach in conjunction with several refinements that address the limitations of his analysis. First, we relax the assumptions of Yu's synthetic cohort method by allowing actual fluctuations in both the volume and country of origin composition of legal permanent residents. This is important because the source countries of family migrants changed since 1980 . Second, we include the 2.7 million IRCA immigrants in the calculations of chain migration because they too can sponsor relatives after their status adjustment. Finally, and critical for our interest in late age-migration, we consider age and regional origins of sponsoring migrants in the calculations.
Data and Methods
We use the Immigrants Admitted to the United States (micro-data) (U.S. A key requirement for estimating chain migration is the class of admission, which is not available on population-based surveys. The United States has a rather complex immigration regime; since 1982, 352 distinct visa classes have been used for LPR admissions. For estimating the family migration multiplier, we collapse these into 10 admission categories that represent the major admission classes and the full range of sponsorship possibilities (Yu 2008) . Importantly, the 10 aggregated admission categories differentiate between (1) initiating and family sponsored immigrants; (2) accompanying versus later-sponsored family unification immigrants; (3) citizen versus LPR sponsored family unification immigrants; and (4) numerically-capped and uncapped admission categories. Figure 2 summarizes the aggregated visa categories used to compute the family migration multiplier.
Figure 2 About Here
Because the distinction between initiating immigrants and family unification migrants is central both to the taxonomy and statistical analysis, further elaboration 11 Ordinarily Oceania is grouped with Europe but the aggregated tabulations did not permit us to reallocate these LPRs. The numbers are relatively small and the allocation decision is inconsequential.
of the operational definitions is warranted. Initiating immigrants refer to all LPRs who are not sponsored by a family migrant, or more generally to nonfamily migrants. 12 Stated differently, they represent the first in their families to move and consequently must either be sponsored by nonfamily entities or they must marry a native-born U.S. citizen. It bears emphasis that a sponsoring spouse must be a U.S.-born citizen rather than a naturalized citizen. Initiating immigrants include employer-sponsored immigrants, refugees and asylees, diversity lottery beneficiaries, and investors, as well as spouses of native-born U.S. citizens. All are denoted in Figure 2 with a "0" subscript, and the letters E, G, and S designate employer, government and spouse sponsors, respectively. 13 LPR's granted LPR status as part of the legalization program authorized by IRCA are not included in the Immigrants Admitted microdata file, but there are several reasons both for including them in a study of chain migration and for analyzing them as a separate category. First, their naturalization behavior differs from that of non-IRCA LPRs both in lower rates and longer time to acquire (Rytina 2002 ). These differences have implications for their ability to sponsor immediate family members. Furthermore, IRCA LPR's differ in their regional origins, with Mexico the dominant source country. As a country with a large visa backlog, this has 12 Other studies use the term "principal immigrants" to refer to initiating immigrants (Yu, 2008; Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1986 ), but we use the term initiating immigrant to avoid confusion with the USDHS use of the term Principal Alien. For example, a sibling of a US citizen sponsored under the family 4 th preference would be classified as a principal alien by DHS (because she can sponsor accompanying family dependents), but would not be an initiating immigrant because an earlier family migrant sponsored her. 13 Technically the government does not formally sponsor LPRs, but initiating immigrants who are not sponsored by a U.S. citizen or an employer are admitted under federal authority (Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1989) . From this perspective, IRCA initiating immigrants represent a special class of "government sponsored" LPRs. 15 We use the letters D, S, C, P, and F, respectively, to 14 These include alien spouses and unmarried minor children of U.S. citizens and the parents of adult U.S. citizens. 15 These include married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens (1st preference); married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens (3 rd preference) and siblings of U.S. citizens age 21 and over (4 th preference). American Community Survey (Ruggles, et al., 2010) . Specifically, for the married foreign-born population, we assume that the proportion married to native-born versus foreign-born spouses corresponds among LPRs admitted as citizens' spouses to the proportions of those sponsored by native-born spouses (i.e., initiating spouse immigrants, 0S) versus foreign-born, naturalized spouses (i.e., numerically-unlimited family migrants, 3S). Our approach to distinguishing between spouses who are initiating immigrants and those who are sponsored as uncapped immediate relatives follows previous research (Yu 2008: 93-94) ; a more detailed explanation of the methodology is provided by Carr (forthcoming).
Family Migration Multiplier
To estimate the magnitude and age contours of chain migration stemming from family unification, we build on Yu's (2005 Yu's ( , 2008 since the mid-1990s the visa delays for adult children of citizens average about nine years for most countries.
As a ratio of all family-sponsored to all initiating migrants, Yu's (2005 Yu's ( , 2008 Net Immigration Unification Multiplier cannot capture the changing age structure among successive cohorts of legal permanent resident admissions. Therefore, we 17 Although there exist visa backlogs for second preference family members, over the period we study these range from two to eight years for most countries, with later applications toward the upper end of that spectrum. Backlogs for prospective second preference admissions from Mexico stretched from two to ten years Expressed in formulaic terms, we estimate the age-and cohort-specific family chain migration multiplier as 18 As detailed in Carr (forthcoming), nine years approximates the average duration of eight-years in LPR status, in conjunction with an additional year for modest visa processing delays. This approach builds on the work of Smith (2003 1981-1985, 1986-1990, 1991-1995, or 1996-2000 timing of the naturalization and eligibility for citizen-based sponsorship among initiating immigrants from cohort t such that t' = t + 9.
Our expanded family migration multiplier not only allows for age and cohort variation, but can also accommodate inter-temporal changes in the regional origins of initiating migrants and subsequent chain migration. We do not present the more complicated formulation specifying regional origins both to avoid notational clutter and because we do not examine sponsorship patterns by regional origins here. who subsequently sponsor their elderly parents and (2) U.S.-born children of foreign-born parents who petition for their parents after reaching age 21. We cannot disentangle these two mechanisms, but differences by regional origins can shed light on these mechanisms. Specifically, we hypothesize that the former mechanism is more prevalent among sponsored parents who hail from Asian countries, whereas the latter is more common among parents of Mexican origin.
Results
Late-age migration also has been on the rise among numerically capped preference relatives of U.S. citizens, which include their adult children as well as siblings and their own dependents. The ceiling on this category has stabilized the total number admitted just over 100 thousand per year, but the share of preference relatives who arrive at age 50 and over has been rising steadily over successive Because the family sponsorship opportunities available to LPRs are far more limited than those available to citizens, this factor may have depressed the migration multiplier for the LPR cohorts during the period we observe.
The number of family LPRs associated with both IRCA-augmented initiating immigrant cohorts grew nonetheless-at first modestly from 2.3 to 2.5 million (see column 2, Table 6 ), and then more robustly, rising from 2.5 to 3.3 million family migrants associated with the 1991-1995 initiating immigrants. Family migration multiplier values for IRCA-era family migration, however small the index value, in fact represent large pools of family immigrants because each reflects a multiplicative effect applied to a massive cohort of initiating immigrants. Even the small late age migration multipliers of 0.19 and 0.23 applied to initiating immigrant cohorts of 2.5 and 3.3 million represent substantial cohorts of late-age migrants sponsored by the IRCA-era LPR cohorts.
Summary and Limitations
Because international migration is presumed to attenuate population aging in developed nations, there has been scant attention to the age composition of immigrants. This omission is striking for the United States, which gives priority to family unification over employment and humanitarian based admissions and sets a minimal income threshold (125% of poverty) for sponsorship of family relatives.
Furthermore, citizens-both naturalized and U.S.-born-are allowed to sponsor immediate relatives, including parents, and these family relatives are not charged against annual worldwide caps. Therefore, we represent family unification since 1981-the most recent era of mass migration-as a multiplicative chain migration process, with due attention to class of admission, period of arrival, and, importantly, age at receipt of LPR status.
Our approach to family chain migration is designed specifically to address the age structure of new immigrants while simultaneously incorporating cohort, sponsorship, and origin variations. Furthermore, we incorporate lags between immigration and naturalization that bear on sponsorship of family members exempt from worldwide ceilings. These adaptations relax the strong assumptions that undergird the synthetic cohort approach used in earlier estimation, but importantly, permit an examination of cohort trends of key sponsorship categories that are relevant for discussions of comprehensive immigration reform. Finally, we extend prior work by updating by a decade the time frame to estimate chain migration, and
including the large cohort of IRCA legalization beneficiaries that was excluded in earlier research.
We show that the cohort share of late-age migration has risen over time, and is mainly driven by government-sponsored non-IRCA LPRs among initiating migrants, and parents of U.S. citizens among family sponsored immigrants. Our 
Figure 4 About Here
Our estimates of family chain migration are conservative to the extent that they do not consider approved petitions for family sponsored migrants, but our inability to consider emigration and mortality introduces bias in the opposite direction by exaggerating the denominator relative to the numerator. Our approach has other limitations, most of which apply to previous studies of family chain migration. By assuming that the proportions of native-born versus naturalized sponsoring citizen spouses mirror the population proportions of married, foreignborn persons with native-born versus foreign-born spouses, we do not incorporate possible relationship formation or dissolution subsequent to migration; whether this is a source of upward or downward bias, however, is not clear. A second issue is that we do not know with certainty who actually sponsors an LPR; rather, like other analysts, we must infer this from the visa code. A final potential source of bias is the validity of using a 9-year lag to estimate the time to naturalization, given the differing naturalization propensities according to auspices of initial entry (e.g., government, employment and spousal sponsorship) and regional origins. Although our approach is more realistic than the synthetic cohort formulation, our future work focused on variations by region of origin will allow us to test the sensitivity of this lag and its implications for family chain migration.
Policy Implications
The 104 for sponsoring a family member was set at 125 percent of poverty for the sponsor and immigrant combined. The 1996 reforms also closed a huge loophole in the Social Security provisions, which allowed late-age migrants to qualify for Supplemental Security Income on the basis of age and low-income rather than disability (Friedland and Pankaj, 1997; Fix, Passel and Zimmerman, 1996 and Passel, 1999; Friedland and Pankaj, 1997; Angel, 2003) , interest in late-age migration has waned over the last dozen years. Age has not been an explicit consideration in the admission of legal permanent residents, except where required to distinguish between minor dependents and others.
Whether Congress will consider comprehensive immigration reform in the near-term is unclear. However, immigration analysts concerned with the economic implications of the current immigration regime will be well advised to consider the consequences of late-age migration, particularly in light of surging health care costs, and re-examine the family preference categories.
FIGURE 1
Source 20% 1981-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 2001-2005 2006- Source: Same as Table 1 . Notes: A) Accompanying family dependents are the spouses and children who migrate with initiating immigrants in family unit migration. They are denoted by 1D in the family migration multiplier formula. B) Percentages may not total 100% due to rounding. C) The final five-year cohort for which multipliers can be calculated is 1996-2000, as based on the typical 9-year lag between permanent residency and naturalization; naturalization is required for most family sponsorship. Source: Same as Table 1 Notes: A) Percentages may not total 100% due to rounding. B) Because of a typical 9-year lag between permanent residence and naturalization, which is a precondition for sponsoring numerically exempt immediate relatives, immediate relative LPRs from the 1990-94, 1995-99, 2000-04, and 2005-09 new immigrant cohorts correspond to initiating immigrants from the 1981-1985, 1986-1990, 1991-1995, and 1996-2000 cohorts. 
